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ABSTRACT
Daily deal sites have become the latest Internet sensation,
providing discounted offers to customers for restaurants, tick-
eted events, services, and other items. We begin by under-
taking a study of the economics of daily deals on the web,
based on a dataset we compiled by monitoring Groupon and
LivingSocial sales in 20 large cities over several months. We
use this dataset to characterize deal purchases; glean insights
about operational strategies of these firms; and evaluate cus-
tomers’ sensitivity to factors such as price, deal schedul-
ing, and limited inventory. We then marry our daily deals
dataset with additional datasets we compiled from Facebook
and Yelp users to study the interplay between social net-
works and daily deal sites. First, by studying user activity
on Facebook while a deal is running, we provide evidence
that daily deal sites benefit from significant word-of-mouth
effects during sales events, consistent with results predicted
by cascade models. Second, we consider the effects of daily
deals on the longer-term reputation of merchants, based on
their Yelp reviews before and after they run a daily deal.
Our analysis shows that while the number of reviews in-
creases significantly due to daily deals, average rating scores
from reviewers who mention daily deals are 10% lower than
scores of their peers on average.
1. INTRODUCTION
Groupon and LivingSocial are websites offering various
deals-of-the-day, with localized deals for major geographic
markets. Groupon in particular has been one of the fastest
growing Internet sales businesses in history, with tens of
millions of registered users and 2011 sales expected to exceed
1 billion dollars.
We briefly describe how daily deal sites work; additional
details relevant to our measurement methodology will be
given subsequently. In each geographic market, or city, there
are one or more deals of the day. Generally, one deal in
each market is the featured deal of the day, and receives
the prominent position on the primary webpage targeting
that market. The deal provides a coupon for some product
or service at a substantial discount (generally 40-60%) to
the list price. Deals may be available for one or more days.
We use the term size of a deal to represent the number of
coupons sold, and the term revenue of a deal to represent
the number of coupons multiplied by the price per coupon.
Groupon retains approximately half the revenue from the
discounted coupons [10], and provides the rest to the seller,
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as does LivingSocial. Deals each have a minimum threshold
size that must be reached for the deal to take hold, and
sellers may also set a maximum threshold size to limit the
number of coupons sold.
Daily deal sites represent a change from recent Internet
advertising trends. While large-scale e-mail distributions
for sale offers are commonplace (generally in the form of
spam) and coupon sites have long existed on the Internet,
Groupon and LivingSocial have achieved notable success
with their emphasis on higher quality localized deals, as well
as their marketing savvy both with respect to buyers and
sellers (merchants). This paper represents an attempt to
gain insight into the success of this business model, using a
combination of data analysis and modeling.
The contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We compile and analyze datasets we gathered moni-
toring Groupon over a period of six months and Liv-
ingSocial over a period of three months in 20 large US
markets. Our datasets will be made publicly available
(on publication of this paper).
• We consider how the price elasticity of demand, as well
as what we call “soft incentives”, affect the size and
revenue of Groupon and LivingSocial deals empirically.
Soft incentives include deal aspects other than price,
such as whether a deal is featured and what days of
the week it is available.
• We study the predictability of the size of Groupon
deals, based on deal parameters and on temporal progress.
We show that deal sizes can be predicted with moder-
ate accuracy based on a small number of parameters,
and with substantially better accuracy shortly after a
deal goes live.
• We examine dependencies between the spread of Groupon
deals and social networks by cross-referencing our Groupon
dataset with Facebook data tracking the frequency
with which users “like” Groupon deals. We offer evi-
dence that propagation of Groupon deals is consistent
with predictions of social spreading made by cascade
models.
• We examine the change in reputation of merchants
based on their Yelp reviews before and after they run
a Groupon deal. We find that reviewers mentioning
daily deals are significantly more negative than their
peers on average, and the volume of their reviews ma-
terially lowers Yelp scores in the months after a daily
deal offering.
We note that we presented preliminary findings based on
a single month of Groupon data that focused predominantly
on the issue of soft incentives in a technical report [3]. The
current paper enriches that study in several ways, both in
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its consideration of LivingSocial as a comparison point, and
especially in our use of social network data sources, such as
Facebook and Yelp, to study deal sites. Indeed, we believe
this use of multiple disparate data sources, while not novel
as a research methodology, appears original in this context
of gaining insight into deal sites.
Before continuing, we acknowledge that a reasonable ques-
tion is why we gathered data ourselves, instead of asking
Groupon for data; such data (if provided) would likely be
more accurate and possibly more comprehensive. We of-
fer several justifications. First, by gathering our own data,
we can make it public, for others to use and to verify our
results. Second, by relying on a deals site as a source for
data, we would be limited to data they were willing to pro-
vide, as opposed to data we thought we needed (and was
publicly available). Gathering our own data also motivated
us to gather and compare data from multiple sources. Fi-
nally, due to fortuitous timing, Groupon’s recent S-1 filing
[10] allowed us to validate several aggregate measures of the
datasets we collected.
Related Work on Daily Deals: To date, there has
been little previous work examining Groupon and LivingSo-
cial specifically. Edelman et al. consider the benefits and
drawbacks of using Groupon from the side of the merchant,
modeling whether the advertising and price discrimination
effects can make such discounts profitable [9]. Dholakia polls
businesses to determine their experience of providing a deal
with Groupon [8], and Arabshahi examines their business
model [2]. Several works have studied other online group
buying schemes that arose before Groupon, and that utilize
substantially different dynamic pricing schemes [1, 12]. Ye
et al. recently provide a stochastic “tipping point” model
for sales from daily deal sites that incorporates social net-
work effects [21]. They provide supporting evidence for their
model using a Groupon data set they collected that is sim-
ilar to, but less comprehensive, than ours, but they do not
measure social network activity.
2. THE DAILY DEALS LANDSCAPE
In this section, we describe the current landscape of daily
deal sites exemplified by Groupon and LivingSocial. We
start by describing the measurement methodology we em-
ployed to collect longitudinal data from these sites, and
provide additional background on how these sites operate.
We then describe basic insights that can be gleaned directly
from our datasets, including revenue and sales broken out
by week, by deal, by geographic location, and by deal type.
Moving on, we observe that given an offering, daily deal
sites can optimize the performance of the offering around
various parameters, most obviously price, but also day-of-
week, duration, etc. We explore these through the lens of
our datasets.
2.1 Measurement Methodology
We collected longitudinal data from the top two group
deal sites, Groupon and LivingSocial, as well as from Face-
book and Yelp. Our datasets are complex and we describe
them in detail below.
2.1.1 Deal data
We collected data from Groupon between January 3rd and
July 3rd, 2011. We monitored – to the best of our knowl-
edge – all deals offered in 20 different cities during this pe-
riod. Our criteria for city selection were population and ge-
ographic distribution. Specifically, our list of cities includes:
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Las Ve-
gas, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Orlando,
Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle,
Tallahassee, Vancouver, and Washington DC. In total, our
data set contains statistics for 16,692 deals.
Each Groupon deal is associated with a set of features:
the deal description, the retail and discounted prices, the
start and end dates, the threshold number of sales required
for the deal to be activated, the number of coupons sold,
whether the deal was available in limited quantities, and if
it sold out. Each deal is also associated with a category such
as “Restaurants”, “Nightlife”, or “Automotive”. From these
basic features we compute further quantities of interest such
as the revenue derived by each deal, the deal duration, and
the percentage discount.
With each Groupon deal, we collected intraday time-series
data which monitors two time-varying parameters: cumula-
tive sales, and whether or not a given deal is currently fea-
tured. To compile these time-series, we monitored each deal
in roughly ten-minute intervals and downloaded the value of
the sales counter. Occasionally some of our requests failed
and therefore some gaps are present in our time-series data,
but this does not materially affect our conclusions. The
second parameter we monitored was whether a deal was fea-
tured or not, with featured deals being those deals that are
presented in the subject line of daily subscriber e-mails while
being given prominent presentation in the associated city’s
webpage. For example, visiting groupon.com/boston, one
notices that a single deal occupies a significant proportion
of the screen real-estate, while the rest of the deals which
are concurrently active are summarized in a smaller sidebar.
Although Groupon has a public API1 through which one
can obtain some basic deal information, we decided also to
monitor the Groupon website directly. Our primary ratio-
nale was that certain deal features, such as whether a link to
reviews for the merchant offering the deal was present, were
not available through the Groupon API. We used the API
to obtain a category for each deal and to validate the sales
data we collected. Observed discrepancies were infrequent
and small: we used the API-collected data as the ground
truth in these cases. We did not use the API to collect
time-series data.
We collected data from LivingSocial between March 21st
and July 3rd, 2011 for the same set of 20 cities. In total,
our LivingSocial dataset contains 2,609 deals. LivingSocial
deals differ from their Groupon counterparts in that they
have no tipping point, and in that they do not explicitly
indicate whether they are available in limited quantities (al-
though they do sell out occasionally). LivingSocial runs two
types of deals: one featured deal per day, and a secondary
“Family Edition”deal, which offers family-friendly activities,
and receives less prominent placement on the LivingSocial
website. For LivingSocial deals we only collected data on
their outcomes; we did not collect time-series data.
2.1.2 Facebook data
Both Groupon and LivingSocial display a Facebook Like
button for each deal, where the Like button is associated
with a counter representing the number of Facebook users
who have clicked the button to express their positive feed-
1http://www.groupon.com/pages/api
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Figure 1: Weekly revenue and sales in 20 selected cities (2011).
Jan Mar May Jul
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
Sa
le
s/
de
al
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
$5
K
$1
0K
$1
5K
$2
0K
R
ev
e
nu
e
/d
ea
l
l
Sales/deal
Revenue/deal
(a) Groupon
Apr May Jun
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
Sa
le
s/
de
al
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
$1
5K
$2
0K
$2
5K
$3
0K
R
ev
e
nu
e
/d
ea
l
l
Sales/deal
Revenue/deal
(b) LivingSocial
Figure 2: Revenue and coupons sold per deal week-over-week.
back. We refer to the value of the counter as the number
of likes a deal has received, and we collected this value for
each Groupon and LivingSocial deal in our dataset.
As a technical aside, we mention that Groupon and Liv-
ingSocial have different implementations of the Facebook
Like button that necessitated our collecting data from them
in different ways. Within each deal page, Groupon embeds
code that dynamically renders the Facebook Like button. It
does so by sending Facebook a request that contains a unique
identifier associated with the corresponding deal page. We
extracted the unique identifier from Groupon deal pages and
directly contacted Facebook to obtain the number of likes for
every deal. LivingSocial instead hard-codes the Like button
and its associated counter within each page. As we could
not obtain the identifier associated with each LivingSocial
deal, we could not query Facebook to independently obtain
the number of likes, and thus we collected the hard-coded
number from LivingSocial deal pages.
2.1.3 Yelp data
Groupon occasionally displays reviews for the merchant
offering the deal in the form of a star-rating, as well as se-
lected reviewer comments. The reviews are sourced from
major review sites such as Yelp, Citysearch, and TripAdvi-
sor. For Groupon deals that were linked to Yelp reviews,
we collected the individual reviewer ratings and comments
left by customers on Yelp. We collected this dataset dur-
ing the first week of September 2011. In total, our dataset
contains 56,048 reviews, for 2,332 merchants who ran 2,496
deals on Groupon during our monitoring period. Yelp has
implemented one measure to discourage the automated col-
lection of reviews which directly affected our data collec-
tion: it hides a set of user reviews for each merchant. To
see the hidden reviews, one has to solve a CAPTCHA. We
did not attempt to circumvent CAPTCHAs, and we do not
know whether the hidden reviews are randomly selected, or
are selected by other criteria. Since Yelp reports the total
number of reviews available per merchant, we ascertained
that approximately 23% of all reviews for merchants in our
dataset were hidden from our collection.
2.2 Operational Insights
Figure 1 serves as an overview of insights we are able to
gain using our dataset. It displays the weekly revenue as well
as the weekly sales of coupons across all 20 cities we moni-
tored for Groupon and LivingSocial, respectively. Notably,
while both Groupon and LivingSocial are widely regarded as
companies enjoying extremely rapid growth, our first take-
away from these plots is that sales and revenue in these 20
established markets are relatively flat across the time pe-
riod. We conjecture that much of the reported growth is in
newer markets.
By happenstance, Groupon’s recent S-1 filing [10] pro-
vided financial information that allowed us to validate some
of the aggregate revenue data that we collected indepen-
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(b) LivingSocial, slope = −0.43
Figure 3: Deal size by price (in logarithmic scale.) Black dots highlight deals in LA; grey dots are used for other cities. A
trend line fitted using OLS regression for all data is also shown.
dently. For example, the filing states that in the three
months ending March 31, 2011, Groupon had sold 950,689
deals in Chicago earning $21.5M in revenues. Our dataset
accounts for 967,244 deals sold and $21.3M in revenues. For
the same period in Boston, the filing reports 388,178 deals
sold for total revenues of $9.3M compared to 362,823 deals
and $8.7M in our dataset. In both cases, our observations
closely match what the company reported. The small differ-
ences may have arisen for several reasons: we did not moni-
tor all revenue generating activities (such as direct backchan-
nels provided to merchants); some deals were offered at mul-
tiple prices but we only monitored the main one; our ac-
counting methods might differ from Groupon’s; our inabil-
ity to account for refunds; and our monitoring infrastructure
may have overlooked some deals.
Outliers in our plots are not due to especially strong per-
formance in local markets, but instead seem to be generated
by large national deals. The three most significant outliers
for both Groupon and LivingSocial each correspond to a
large national offer. Representative deals noted in Figure 1
include $10 for $20 in Barnes & Noble merchandise during
the week of 1/31 for Groupon and 7 nights in the Caribbean
during the week of 6/13 for LivingSocial.
The Groupon plot is annotated with two significant events
from the February time period that mark an unusual de-
cline in revenues. On February 6th, Groupon’s Super Bowl
commercials aired, and were found offensive by many peo-
ple; Groupon apologized on their official blog and pulled the
controversial ad campaign [11]. Subsequently, from Febru-
ary 9th to February 11th, in advance of Valentine’s Day,
Groupon offered a nationwide“$20 for $40 Worth of Flowers”
coupon in partnership with FTD Flowers. Shortly there-
after, customers started realizing that when visiting the FTD
Flowers website via Groupon they were shown much higher
prices for the same products compared to customers who vis-
ited the FTD site directly. Furthermore, coupon purchasers
were only allowed to use their coupons on the more expen-
sive version of the product. This deal was widely perceived
as a “bait and switch” scheme; Groupon offered disgruntled
customers refunds2 [18]. The recovery that we observe in
2Since we cannot account for these refunds, the reported
sales and revenues of the week starting on February 7 are
an overestimate.
the revenue indicates that this shock may only have had a
short-term effect on Groupon’s business. Similar short-term
effects have been observed in the time-series of YouTube
video views after exogenous shocks [7].
A different phenomenon is captured in Figure 2, where
we plot week-over-week sales and revenue on a per-deal ba-
sis. For Groupon, sales and revenue per deal in the 20 cities
we monitored peaked in February 2011 and have trended
steadily downward since. For LivingSocial, we observe much
greater variability, obscuring any underlying trend, but per-
deal sales and revenue appear flat or declining. While these
trends could potentially point to underlying fragility in the
daily deals business model (possibly the best revenue-producing
merchants in a geographical area are becoming exhausted),
more benign explanations exist. The trend could reflect a
change in operational strategy to broaden the base of fea-
tured deals available to subscribers at any given time, for
example, to provide better personalization of deals to sub-
scribers. However, revenue growth in established markets
appears to be a potential challenge facing daily deal sites.
2.3 Pricing and Other Incentives
We now consider a range of factors that influence the num-
ber of coupons sold and that daily deal sites can control. Our
primary focus is on Groupon. As daily deal sites have built
their business around deeply discounted offers, one might ex-
pect that the discounted price associated with a deal would
be the primary purchase incentive. Indeed, in the log-log
scatterplots of deal sizes vs. deal prices depicted in Figure 3,
the trend lines fitted using ordinary least-squares (OLS) re-
gression indicate that the logarithm of price and the loga-
rithm of sales are roughly linearly related. While there is a
large amount of variance within individual price points, by
controlling for other features, such as restricting attention
to deals in Los Angeles (black points), the trend becomes
clearer.
A closely related deal feature is the magnitude of the dis-
count, which Groupon displays prominently in advertising
a deal. While we conjecture that customers are sensitive to
this quantity, most discounts presented fall in a relatively
narrow range (three-quarters of all Groupon deals are dis-
counted by 40 to 60%). This has the effect of making the
list price highly correlated (0.90 correlation coefficient) with
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Figure 4: Groupon deal sizes (top row) and deal revenues (bottom row) are shown on the x−axis. On the y−axis deals are
broken down by various deal features. The outer whiskers mark the 5% and 95% quantiles of the deal size, the sides of each
grey rectangle the 1st and 3rd quartiles, the solid bar the median, and the solid dot the mean.
Duration (days) 1 2 3 4+
Mean price $28 $42 $56 $139
Mean sales 712 707 685 529
Mean revenue $12,576 $18,375 $20,010 $20,189
Number of deals 5,464 5,745 3,877 1,606
Table 1: Groupon deals by duration.
Featured Non-featured
Mean sales 1,443 475
Mean revenue $34,181 $12,241
Number of deals 3,644 13,048
Table 2: Groupon deals by placement.
the discount price and therefore the discount is a weak dis-
tinguishing feature once price has been taken into account.
Deal sites can also control the length of time a deal runs.
As shown in Table 1, while deal size varies minimally with
duration, revenue increases, suggesting perhaps that Groupon
is attempting to hit sales, instead of revenue, targets. Ex-
pensive deals may generally sell less quickly, and must be
allowed more time to achieve the same sales goal.
At any point in time, and for each geographic market,
one deal among the set of all available deals is featured by
Groupon. Featured deals receive prominent placement both
on the Groupon website and in the daily email that cus-
tomers receive. In our dataset, 22% of deals were featured.
The impact of featured placement is significant: the mean
sales and revenue for featured deals are well in excess of twice
the corresponding quantities for other deals. The effects of
featuring a deal are summarized in the Table 2. However, we
cannot assume that these outcomes are entirely causal effects
from featuring a deal, as Groupon naturally has an incen-
tive to feature those deals that will drive the most sales. We
investigated whether certain categories of deals as a whole
were featured more frequently. Table 3 breaks down cat-
egories with at least 100 deals by the percentage of deals
within each that was featured.
Another distinguishing characteristic is inventory size: some
deals are available only in limited quantities. Groupon lets
its customers know which deals are limited, but does not dis-
play the number of available units (while some competitors
of Groupon display this prominently). Approximately 31%
of all deals in our dataset are available in limited numbers,
with wide variation across categories. Approximately 50%
of all “Travel”deals and 39% of all “Arts and Entertainment”
deals were available in limited quantities, as one might ex-
pect for these types of deals. Surprisingly, only about 18%
of the limited deals in our dataset sold out. It is not that
these deals are intrinsically less attractive: limited deals out-
performed unlimited deals on average by 11% more coupon
sales and 27% more revenue. It is possible that merchants
(or Groupon) artificially limit deals as a strategy to exert
pressure to customers, making them more likely to purchase
on the spur of the moment.
Groupon also has a choice as to the days of the week that
it schedules each offer. Figure 4e breaks down deals by the
day of the week on which they began. Even though the dif-
ferences are not striking, it appears that deals starting in
the beginning of the week produce less revenue, and deals
starting on Friday produce the most. One possible explana-
tion is that on Fridays, Groupon starts more multi-day deals
that span the weekend. For example, 45% of three-day deals
start on a Friday. However, alternative explanations, such
as that the best deals are run on Friday or that people are
more likely to buy on Friday, may also apply.
Featured (%) # of deals
Arts & Entert. 31% 2,932
Automotive 16% 373
Beauty & Spas 17% 2,476
Education 24% 508
Food & Drink 17% 1,193
Health & Fitness 18% 2,092
Home Services 13% 370
Nightlife 25% 288
Other 24% 327
Prof. Services 18% 673
Restaurants 24% 2,794
Shopping 18% 2,176
Travel 35% 404
Table 3: A breakdown of featured deals by category.
Deals are said to be “on”when they surpass a sales thresh-
old defined by Groupon, possibly in conjunction with the
merchant. That is, for customers to get a discount, a mini-
mum number of them must commit to the deal. In theory,
this could drive a group dynamic whereby customers encour-
age their friends to buy a coupon to reach the threshold.
However, current deal thresholds are very low. For exam-
ple, in our dataset, the mean threshold to total sales ratio
is approximately 19%. Deals that surpassed their thresh-
old did so on average just after 8am, and only 2% of deals
with thresholds failed to reach them. Like the relationship
between price to deal size, the relationship between thresh-
old and deal size also appears to be linear when plotted in
logarithmic scale.
Deals can also be classified by two features that Groupon
does not have direct control over: their geographic market,
and their category. Figure 4a shows that while overall deal
sizes vary considerably across cities, and not always in pro-
portion to city population. This is in part due to localiza-
tion: Long Island has a separate Groupon deal stream from
New York; similarly Los Angeles is split into multiple sub-
areas. As for deal categories, Figure 4b suggests that deals
that are the most lucrative in terms of revenue for Groupon
are not the most popular with their customers. For ex-
ample, while “Travel” deals produce fewer sales than most
other categories on average, they produce the most revenue;
conversely “Restaurants” deals are the most popular, but
produce much less revenue.
Finally, it is not especially surprising, but still notable
that we observe heavy-tailed behavior throughout Figure 4,
with the mean deal producing many more sales and much
more revenue than the median in essentially all cases.
3. MODELING DEAL OUTCOMES
Having considered various deal features and their individ-
ual correlation with deal size and revenue individually, we
now consider these characteristics collectively using regres-
sion. Our goal is both to better quantify the dependence
of deal outcomes on the various features, and to determine
if such models are sufficiently accurate to predict the out-
comes of future deals. The model we use for Groupon deals,
noting that all logarithms are base e, is:
log q = β0 + β1 log p+ β2 log t+ β3d+ β4f + β5l
+ β¯6w + β¯7c+ β¯8g (1)
where q stands for the deal size, p for the coupon price, t for
the threshold, d for whether the deal is run for multiple days
or not, f for whether the deal is featured or not, and l for
whether the deal inventory is limited or not. The values of
p and t are centered to their corresponding medians (25 in
both cases). This allows for a more intuitive interpretation
of the regression’s intercept but does not otherwise affect our
results. The parameters w, c and g are dummy-coded vec-
tors representing the starting day of the week, category, and
city relative to notional reference levels; their corresponding
coefficients are also vectors. Dummy-coding refers to using
binary vectors to encode categorical variables, where a vari-
able that can take on k distinct values is encoded using a
binary vector of length k− 1 where at most one entry is set
to one. We also fitted a similar log-log model to LivingSocial
deals with similar results to those we report below.
The exact form the model takes upon is motivated by the
observations of Section 2.3: log p and log t are well mod-
eled as having a linear relationship to log q, while the rest
of the variables in our model are either boolean or categor-
ical in nature. Given the high correlation of the list price
to the discounted price, we have chosen to exclude it from
the model to avoid introducing multicollinearity. Also, since
most multi-day deals last for two days, and there is little
variance in the number of sales among multi-day deals, we
have chosen (after experimentation) to encode duration as
a boolean feature.
We fitted the model using ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression. The parameter estimates, their standard errors,
and their significance levels are shown in Table 7a in the
appendix. A similar model of LivingSocial deals appears
in Table 7b. We focus the presentation of our results on
Groupon.
The intercept of the model is the unconditional expected
mean of the logarithm of the size of a deal. For example, the
expected mean of the log-size of a deal in the “Other” cate-
gory, priced at $25, with a threshold of 25, not featured, with
unlimited inventory, starting on Monday, and running for a
single day in Atlanta, is 5.19. Equivalently, the expected
geometric mean of the size of the same deal is e5.19 ≈ 179.
The coefficient of log p is particularly interesting because
its value is the point-price elasticity of demand for coupons.
To see this, recall that the point-elasticity ηp is defined as:
ηp = (∂q/q)/(∂p/p) = ∂ log q/∂ log p = β1. (2)
For deal size, the point-price elasticity given by our regres-
sion model is −0.48. Intuitively, this means that for a 1%
increase in price, we expect a (roughly3) 0.48% decrease in
demand. Since ηp > −1 the demand is said to be inelas-
tic. This matches our intuition: coupons already represent
heavy discounts and as such, changes in price should have a
relatively less significant impact upon demand.
The coefficients of non-log-transformed variables represent
differences in the expected means of log-sales, and their ex-
3The point-price elasticity relates infinitesimal percentage
changes in price to percentage changes in demand. For any
small enough percentage change in price the estimated per-
centage change in sales will be reasonably accurate.
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Figure 5: Actual vs. predicted sales for a test set of Groupon
deals, in log-log scale for our plain regression model, as well
as the the model incorporating early morning sales.
ponentiated values represent multiplicative increases (or de-
creases) in the expected geometric mean of sales. For exam-
ple, the expected ratio of the geometric means of sales for
multi-day deals to single-day deals is e0.22 ≈ 1.25. A sim-
ple interpretation is that by running a deal for more than a
day, we expect a 25% increase in sales. The effect of featur-
ing a deal is, as anticipated, far greater: featured deals are
expected to perform 141% better than their non-featured
counterparts. Limiting a deal, in the presence of all the
other parameters in our model, does not have a statistically
significant effect.
Overall, the F -statistic (345) and the p-value (< 2 ·10−16)
of the model indicate that we can reject the null hypothe-
sis (that there is no relation between sales and any of the
explanatory variables in our model) with high confidence.
However, the R2 (0.49) value of the model suggests mod-
erate predictive power. We tested this against a test set
of 1,522 deals that ran in the same 20 cities between Au-
gust 18th and 31st. Figure 5 shows the number of sales our
model predicts against their actual sales. As anticipated by
the R2 value of our model, our predictions are generally well
correlated with actual sales, with noticeably large errors for
certain individual deals.
Not surprisingly, our model consistently overestimates weak
deals with a very small number of actual sales, and tends to
underestimate the strongest deals, indicating that there are
additional factors at work not captured by our model. One
such factor we study in Section 4.1 is how social networks
can influence deal sales. Another possible influence on pur-
chasing decisions could be merchant reputations, which we
consider below, and in the other direction (how Groupon
offers affect reputation) in Section 4.2. One clear major in-
fluence is that some deals are national in scope, and our
largest underestimates appear to be for these deals. For ex-
ample, as shown in in Figure 5, some of the larger errors
in underestimating deal size correspond to a national deal
for Quiznos sandwiches. Incorporating these additional re-
finements to improve the predictive power of our models is
future work.
We consider two variations on our basic model:
Early-morning sales: We have incorporated first-day
sales at 7am from our time-series dataset into our basic
model. Our reasoning is that a deal site may want to obtain
an improved prediction of deal performance early in the day
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Figure 6: Average cumulative first day sales across all
Groupon deals in our dataset.
D
ur
a
tio
n 
(da
ys
)
N
um
be
r o
f d
ea
ls
0
10
00
20
00
1
0
10
00
20
00
2
0
10
00
20
00
3
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
Figure 7: The number of deals starting on any given day of
the week, broken down by their eventual duration.
(and perhaps adjust accordingly). We present data for 7am
for 2 reasons. First, Groupon generally sends email between
4am and 6am, and we want to see effects after the e-mail
is sent. Second, as shown in Figure 6, on average Groupon
deals have sold less than 7% of their eventual first day sales
by 7am, so the time is suitable for an early prediction. Un-
surprisingly, the predictive power of our model is greatly
improved with this feature, as indicated by an increased R2
of 0.81, and as shown in Figure 5. Detailed regression results
are shown in Table 8a in the Appendix.
Yelp merchant reviews: We also attempted to add the
Yelp rating of merchants prior to their Groupon deal as a
parameter to our model for the deals for which we had a
rating available (2,522 of them). This failed to significantly
improve our model. One explanation is that the average
Yelp star-rating displayed for each business may not be es-
pecially significant to Groupon buyers; instead they might
prefer scanning individual reviews and ratings on Yelp. An-
other is that there is only moderate variance in the mer-
chants Groupon selects to give Yelp ratings for; we found
68% of the reviewed merchants had an average rating rang-
ing between 3.5 and 4.5 stars, and 95% between 3 and 5
stars. Detailed regression results are shown in Table 8b in
the Appendix. As a consequence of limiting our dataset to
only on those merchants for whom we could acquire a Yelp
rating we cannot obtain coefficient estimates for every deal
category. For example, as we could not obtain any reviews
for deals in the “Real Estate” category we cannot compute
the corresponding coefficient.
3.1 Deal Scheduling
One further optimization available to daily deal sites is
managing how deals are scheduled. Our data shows that
Groupon is already managing deal schedules in non-trivial
Following category
Art Aut Bea Edu Foo Hea Hom Nig Oth Pet Pro Pub Res Sho Tra
P
r
e
c
e
d
in
g
Art 237/241 10/15 107/106 30/31 48/51 79/89 11/13 25/19 15/20 0/1 34/29 1/ 1 187/167 95/97 40/38
Aut 15/ 15 0/ 1 9/ 7 2/ 2 4/ 4 8/ 7 2/ 1 0/ 1 2/ 1 0/0 1/ 2 0/ 0 11/ 11 5/ 6 2/ 2
Bea 111/106 7/ 8 21/ 51 13/14 24/25 48/46 7/ 6 12/ 8 7/10 0/0 12/15 0/ 0 99/ 77 45/46 23/16
Edu 33/ 32 2/ 2 7/ 14 5/ 4 9/ 7 13/12 1/ 1 2/ 2 4/ 3 0/0 3/ 4 0/ 0 27/ 23 9/13 7/ 5
Foo 57/ 49 6/ 4 26/ 25 5/ 6 7/12 19/21 4/ 3 2/ 4 10/ 5 1/0 6/ 7 1/ 0 31/ 39 22/24 9/ 8
Hea 101/ 91 8/ 6 36/ 46 9/12 15/21 39/39 2/ 5 10/ 8 10/ 8 0/0 11/13 0/ 0 83/ 69 37/37 8/14
Hom 10/ 12 1/ 1 10/ 6 1/ 1 2/ 3 6/ 5 0/ 1 1/ 1 1/ 1 0/0 0/ 2 0/ 0 7/ 9 4/ 5 3/ 2
Nig 23/ 19 2/ 1 10/ 9 2/ 2 3/ 4 8/ 7 2/ 1 0/ 2 2/ 2 0/0 2/ 2 0/ 0 11/ 13 5/ 7 3/ 3
Oth 12/ 19 0/ 1 4/ 10 6/ 2 10/ 5 6/ 8 3/ 1 3/ 2 0/ 2 0/0 7/ 3 0/ 0 19/ 14 9/ 8 0/ 4
Pet 1/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 2/ 1 0/ 0
Pro 17/ 28 2/ 2 14/ 15 3/ 4 10/ 6 7/12 1/ 2 1/ 2 5/ 3 0/0 4/ 4 1/ 0 18/ 23 25/13 8/ 5
Pub 2/ 1 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/ 0 0/0 0/ 0 0/ 0 1/ 1 1/ 0 0/ 0
Res 177/167 16/11 114/ 77 26/23 35/39 83/70 7/ 9 8/13 10/14 1/0 24/22 1/ 1 65/128 83/71 21/25
Sho 95/ 98 6/ 6 50/ 46 14/13 28/22 37/38 4/ 6 4/ 7 10/ 9 1/1 12/13 0/ 1 72/ 70 37/44 14/14
Tra 29/ 38 1/ 2 20/ 16 6/ 5 12/ 8 12/14 4/ 1 3/ 3 3/ 3 0/0 2/ 5 0/ 0 36/ 25 10/14 4/ 6
Table 4: The observed/expected number of times one featured category follows another.
ways. For example, there are far fewer deals offered on week-
ends, but more multi-day deals run over weekends. In an-
other example, in Figure 7, we plot the duration of deals
by the day of the week that they started on. The subplots
show the counts of one-day, two-day, and three-day deals by
their starting day of the week. We observe that Groupon
initiates most one-day deals Monday through Thursday and
most three-day deals on Fridays and weekends.
We also find evidence that deals are scheduled according
to their category; specifically, that Groupon avoids placing
featured deals of the same category back-to-back over con-
secutive days in the same city. This is a natural strategy to
maintain user interest, related to issues of ad fatigue (or ad-
vertising wear out) studied in other contexts [4, 6]. Table 4
summarizes an experiment we conducted to investigate this
phenomenon. For each pair of categories we show the ob-
served number of occurrences of that event followed by the
expected number of occurrences if deals had been scheduled
independently at random. Deviations from random are gen-
erally small, except for certain categories on the diagonal of
this matrix, which indicates that Groupon avoids featuring
the same category back-to-back.
We note that the problem of how deal sites should best
schedule deals to optimize revenue or sales remains an inter-
esting direction for future work.
4. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
We now move from studying solely the deal data to con-
sidering the interplay between social networks and daily deal
sites, specifically quantifying the impact of Facebook users
while a deal is running, and of Yelp reviewers as they provide
feedback about merchants.
We focus on two distinct issues. First, while many indi-
viduals may be enticed to purchase a Groupon based just
on the daily e-mail, we hypothesize that many others are
activated based entirely or in part by social factors. One
observable quantity we leverage to investigate this hypoth-
esis is the number of individuals who “like” a given deal
on Facebook. Our measurement study quantifies the corre-
lation between two sets of time-series: Groupons sold and
Facebook likes. Our evidence indicates clear network effects
from social influence, and is consistent with basic cascade
models of activation from the theoretical literature.
Second, we consider another social construct: the influ-
ence of a Groupon sale on merchants’ reputations as de-
termined by online reviews. Specifically, we study Yelp re-
views of restaurants before and after a Groupon offer. Not
surprisingly, we find a surge in reviews from new customers
subsequent to the offer. But we also find that reviewers men-
tioning “Groupons” and “coupons” provide strikingly lower
rating scores than those that do not, and these reviews re-
duce Yelp scores over time in our dataset.
4.1 Do Deals Propagate via Facebook Likes?
Groupon deals can be shared with friends by text, e-mail,
Facebook, Twitter, and other means. Facebook offers a
readily observable measure, which we use as a proxy for more
general social sharing here: Groupon has added a Facebook
Like button on each deal’s web page. Should a Facebook
user decide that he likes a Groupon deal (no purchase nec-
essary) and clicks the Like button, a like counter shown next
to the button is incremented, and a short message to that
effect is distributed to the user’s Facebook friends by means
of their news feeds. These messages may then propagate
recursively through Facebook, potentially creating a sales-
enhancing word-of-mouth effect.
Here we examine whether Facebook likes correlate with
the final deal size, and then ask whether the data appears
consistent with current models for the effects of social net-
works on buying decisions. We note recent work also sug-
gests social spreading as a significant determinant of final
deal size, giving a model where once the tipping point of
a deal is reached, it grows due to a stochastic process that
models social spreading [21]. Their model appears orthogo-
nal to our analysis.
We emphasize that we must be careful not to conflate
correlation and causation; it is not clear that likes inspire
purchases, even if the number of likes and deal sizes are cor-
related. As a strawman, consider a model where each pur-
chaser ignores prior likes, and pushes the Like button with
probability p after deciding to purchase. In this setting,
likes and purchases would be closely (linearly) correlated,
even though likes would not promote purchases. Indeed,
this provides an interesting null hypothesis: are likes sim-
ply proportional to sales? Our data suggests that this is
not the case: Figures 8a and 8b suggest a non-linear rela-
tionship, where the deal size is roughly proportional to the
number of likes raised to a power much less than 1. Also,
deals with approximately the same number of likes can vary
significantly in terms of final deal size. (A more detailed
breakdown appears in Figure 9.)
We can gain some further insight by adding likes to our
regression model. Table 9 in the Appendix summarizes the
results of regressing deal size on the various deal features
and Facebook activity. Adding the logarithm of the number
of likes as an additional variable on the right hand side of
the model Equation 1 improves our R2 statistic from 0.49
to 0.63 for Groupon and from 0.38 to 0.67 for LivingSocial.
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Figure 8: Deal size vs. number of Facebook likes (in logarithmic scale.) Black dots highlight deals in LA; grey dots are used
for other cities. A trend line fitted using OLS regression is also shown.
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Figure 9: Number of Facebook likes are depicted on the x−axis. On the y−axis deals are broken down by various deal
features. The outer whiskers mark the 5% and 95% quantiles of the deal size and revenue, the sides of each grey rectangle
the 1st and 3rd quartiles, the solid bar the median, and the solid dot the mean.
While this improvement is not directly useful for, for exam-
ple, predicting deal size a priori, it demonstrates a strong
correlation between the logarithms of likes and deal size.
Social Spreading: We do not currently have (and have
not sought) direct evidence of social spreading of deals via
likes; this would require either detailed knowledge of the
Facebook social network, or a detailed user study. Both are
beyond the scope of this paper, but are interesting questions
for future work. Here, however, we examine whether our
data is consistent with theoretical models of social spreading
from the literature (e.g., [13, 16]). In such models, there
is generally a seed set of users that initially recommend a
product; then additional users activate and buy the product
based on these recommendations. Here, we treat Facebook
likes as recommendations for a specific deal.
Two key features of cascade models are how the seed set is
selected, and how inactive users are activated by neighbors.
In our setting, we consider the seed set to be Groupon sub-
scribers who are informed of the daily deal through Groupon’s
daily email and proceed to like the deal on Facebook. (Likely,
those in the seed set also purchase the deal, but this is irrel-
evant to the cascade dynamics we consider here.) Our data
provides insight into the size of the seed set, but not into
the how the seed set should be selected. Previous work [5,
19, 20] has established the correlation between degree and
activity in social networks. In [20] the authors demonstrate
that the top 50% of Facebook users by degree are respon-
sible for most social interactions. Kwak et al. [14] make a
similar case for Twitter, where they demonstrate that users
with more followers are more like to tweet. The potential
implication, translated to our setting, is that Groupon cus-
tomers who have more friends on Facebook are more likely
to belong to the seed set. We test this by simulating cascade
models with the seed set selected uniformly at random, and
as the top-k nodes by degree.
With regard to activation, we consider two standard vari-
ations: a user is activated with fixed probability p by each
of his active neighbors, and each active user u activates user
v with probability 1/dv, where dv is the degree of user v.
The first model activates high-degree nodes more frequently.
These cases correspond to the Independent Cascade (IC)
and Weighted Cascade (WC) models of Kempe et al. [13].
Finally, we model that each activated user purchases the
deal with fixed probability q, which can be thought of as the
conversion rate. Note that we separate the issues of activa-
tion and purchase; in our setting, activation corresponds to
noticing the deal, rather than purchasing it.
We ran experiments based on these models on a network
that has common characteristics with social network graphs,
the arXiv High Energy Physics collaboration network from
[15]. This network consists of 9,877 nodes and 51,971 edges.
The results are shown in Figure 10. We plot the number
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Figure 10: Sales as predicted by two diffusion models.
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Figure 11: The average Yelp star-rating for merchants before
and after their Groupon offers (line-chart), and the average
number of reviews per merchant per month (bar-chart).
of sales resulting by the cascade against the seed set size
averaged over 100 trials per starting seed set size. We ran
our experiments both by selecting a random seed set, and
by selecting the top-k nodes by degree. The high-degree
heuristic resembles our empirical findings more closely. For
the IC model we set p = 2%, and for both models q = 5%.
We observe that in both cases, when using top-k nodes as
the seed set, we observe sublinear gains in the size of the
cascade as the size of the seed set increases. These results
match previous work such as [13], and give some insight into
our empirical findings.
While these results suggest that social spreading is a fea-
ture of daily deals, current theoretical models are too sim-
plistic to capture the array of features we have found to
be important in determining deal size, with price being the
most obviously relevant. It may also be useful to specifically
consider models for daily deals in the context of cascading
recommendations (e.g., [16]); this could also be helpful in
explaining the large observed variance in deal sizes across
deals with the same number of likes.
4.2 Yelp Feedback on Groupon Merchants
A key selling point of a daily deals site is the promise
of beneficial long-term effects for merchants participating in
a deal offering. Since discounted deals typically result in a
net short-term loss to the merchant as customers redeem the
coupons, a merchant is pitched on the expectation that some
new customers, initially attracted by the deal, will become
repeat customers, providing a long-term gain [9]. Participat-
ing merchants should determine that these gains outweigh
Avg. Rating Reviews
Before period (12 months) 3.71 39,042
After period (6 months) 3.59 17,006
Table 5: Yelp reviews around a merchant’s Groupon offer.
the costs, which include providing discounts to their existing
customer base.
While we do not have data to directly evaluate the long-
term financial impact for Groupon merchants, we consider
a novel, alternative approach to concretely quantify the im-
pact of Groupon deals on a merchant’s reputation. Specifi-
cally, we examine the extent to which a Groupon deal affects
review scores at Yelp, a popular online review site. We view
review scores as a useful proxy for both direct repeat busi-
ness as well as for new business from word-of-mouth effects.
Groupon often displays a Yelp rating for the merchant
offering a specific deal. For each Groupon deal associated
with a Yelp rating, we collected all the individual reviews
posted on Yelp up through August 2011. Yelp reviews are
comprised of a star-rating ranging from one to five stars,
the review text, and the date the review was written. We
associated each review with an offset, measured in months,
from the earliest Groupon deal in our dataset for the corre-
sponding merchant, i.e., if a Groupon offer occurred in June
2011, a review for that merchant dated March 2011 would
have an offset of -3. For each merchant, and for each integer
offset (up through July 2011), we computed the merchant’s
average star-rating, thereby constructing a time-series of the
star-rating value oriented around the first Groupon offer that
we observed for a merchant. Figure 11 presents our find-
ings. The line-chart displays the average star-rating across
all Yelp-rated merchants in our dataset for each offset, with
the x-axis depicting the offset from the time of the offer.
The bar-chart depicts the average review volume over the
same period, using the scale on the right-hand side of the
y-axis, and measured in reviews per merchant per month.
Lighter shading indicates total review volume, while darker
shading indicates the volume of reviews that contain the
keyword “Groupon”. (Mentions of Groupon in reviews with
negative offsets are mostly due to user reviews for merchants
who ran an additional offer before we began collecting data.
Excluding these merchants does not materially change our
findings.)
In looking at Figure 11, we first consider the behavior
prior to Groupon offers. While month to month scores vary,
they appear essentially flat. The average number of reviews
slowly increases (likely as Yelp itself is growing). There are
few Groupon mentions. We think of these qualitative be-
haviors as our baseline.
Subsequent to the Groupon deal, we see marked changes
in behavior. First, on average, the number of user-contributed
reviews increases significantly after a Groupon offer, and
based on the proportion of Groupon mentions, the Groupon
deal appears to be the proximate cause. We quantify this
change using the monthly number of Yelp reviews as a proxy.
Our methodology is as follows: let Yi be the average num-
ber of reviews merchant i received per month in the three
months before the Groupon offer. Let Zi be the number of
reviews the month of the Groupon offer. We compute the
percentage change in number of reviews for each merchant
the month of the Groupon offer as (Zi − Yi)/Yi. (This re-
quires Yi > 0.) Similarly, we can compute the percentage
change for the month after the Groupon offer. We find that
the average percentage increase in reviews across all mer-
chants who had received at least one review in the 3 months
prior to the Groupon offer is 44%. Meanwhile, the average
month-over-month growth in number of reviews for deals
prior to their Groupon offers is about 5%. Similarly, the
average percentage increase in reviews the month after the
Groupon offer is 84%. Roughly 20% of merchants in our
dataset (461 out of 2,332) had received zero reviews in the 3
months prior to the Groupon offer. Of these, 270 received at
least one review within two months after the Groupon offer.
Our second conclusion is that Yelp star ratings decline
after a Groupon deal. To quantify the magnitude of the de-
cline, we employed the following methodology: as our base-
line, we computed the average of all reviews with a negative
offset (before the Groupon offer). Similarly, we computed
the average of all reviews with a positive offset (after the
Groupon offer). We deemed reviews with offset zero as am-
biguous, due to data collection granularity, and they were
not considered. The results of the before and after com-
parison are depicted in Table 5. The average drop in rat-
ings is 0.12. This could affect any sorted order produced
according to Yelp rankings significantly. Also, Yelp scores
are reported and displayed according to discretized half-star
increments. Thus, an average drop of 0.12 suggests a sig-
nificant number of merchants may lose a half-star due to
rounding. This could have a potentially important effect
on a business; a recent study reports that for independent
restaurants a one-star increase in Yelp rating leads to a 9%
increase in revenue [17]. However, the transitory nature of
Groupon-driven reviews, in addition to complexities of mod-
eling hidden factors like weighted moving averages, cloud our
ability to pinpoint the reputational ramifications precisely.
To provide further attribution for the decline, we con-
ducted additional text analysis on the content of individual
reviews. The results are summarized in Table 6, which cate-
gorizes the user-contributed reviews according to occurrence
of the keywords“Groupon”and“coupon”. Reviews mention-
ing either keyword are associated with star ratings that are
10% lower on average than reviews that do not, while the
very small fraction of reviews mentioning both keywords are
more than 20% lower on average.
Ultimately, the economic ramifications of reputational ef-
fects due to running a daily deal remain uncertain. The
positive impact of quickly reaching a broad, new audience is
precisely in line with the daily deals sales pitch, and is borne
out by the surge in reviews that we witness in our dataset.
However, the lower-on-average rating scores in those reviews
mentioning Groupon provides a cautionary note: this could
indicate that a more critical audience is being reached, or
that the fit between the merchant and these new customers
is more tenuous than with existing customers.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Our examination of daily deal sites, and particularly Groupon,
has used data-driven analysis to investigate relationships be-
tween deal attributes and deal size beyond simple measures
such as the offer price. Indeed, the scope of our investiga-
tion goes well outside of deal sites, to consider Groupon’s
relationship with the larger electronic commerce ecosystem,
including Facebook and Yelp. We believe we expose signifi-
Coupon mentioned
Yes No
Groupon Yes 2.98 (354) 3.36 (4,315)
mentioned No 3.36 (1,166) 3.71 (50,213)
Table 6: Yelp reviews broken down by mentions of the key-
words “Groupon” and “Coupon”. The average rating as well
as the number of reviews (in parentheses) are shown.
cant complexity in understanding behavior in these systems.
In particular, predicting deal sizes in settings where price, a
multiplicity of other deal parameters, as well as the potential
for social cascades to affect the outcome, provides a clear,
albeit difficult, challenge. We also suggest the mining of
publicly accessible Internet data, such as content on review
sites, to benchmark the success of deal sites for merchants,
in terms of the effect on their reputation. Expanding this
approach to other data sources (such as Twitter or blogs)
could yield further insights.
While our focus here has been on data analysis, we believe
our work opens the door to several significant questions in
both modeling and optimizing deal sites and similar elec-
tronic commerce systems.
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APPENDIX
A. DETAILED REGRESSION RESULTS
Est. Std. Err. Signif.
In
c
e
n
t
iv
e
s (Intercept) 5.19 0.07 ***
log Price -0.48 0.01 ***
log Threshold 0.56 0.01 ***
Multi-day? 0.22 0.02 ***
Featured? 0.88 0.02 ***
Limited? 0.01 0.02
S
t
a
r
t
D
a
y
Mon Reference level
Tue 0.15 0.03 ***
Wed 0.22 0.03 ***
Thu 0.23 0.03 ***
Fri 0.24 0.03 ***
Sat 0.02 0.03
Sun -0.08 0.03 **
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
Other Reference level
Arts and Entertainment -0.08 0.06
Automotive 0.12 0.08
Beauty & Spas 0.09 0.06
Education -0.21 0.07 **
Financial Services -1.87 0.41 ***
Food & Drink 0.14 0.06 *
Health & Fitness -0.01 0.06
Home Services -0.28 0.08 ***
Legal Services -1.04 0.99
Nightlife -0.25 0.08 **
Pets -0.33 0.13 *
Professional Services -0.17 0.07 *
Public Services & Gov. -0.61 0.38
Real Estate 0.14 0.50
Restaurants 0.22 0.06 ***
Shopping -0.02 0.06
Travel 0.14 0.07 .
C
it
y
Atlanta Reference level
Boston 0.07 0.04 .
Chicago 0.32 0.04 ***
Dallas -0.02 0.05
Detroit -0.10 0.05 *
Houston -0.10 0.05 *
Las Vegas -0.03 0.05
Los Angeles 0.25 0.04 ***
Miami -0.27 0.05 ***
New Orleans -0.64 0.06 ***
New York -0.01 0.04
Orlando -0.21 0.05 ***
Philadelphia -0.37 0.05 ***
San Diego -0.08 0.05
San Francisco 0.24 0.05 ***
San Jose 0.06 0.06
Seattle 0.23 0.05 ***
Tallahassee -0.85 0.08 ***
Vancouver 0.24 0.06 ***
Washington DC 0.47 0.04 ***
F -statistic 345 p-value < 2e-16
R-squared 0.49
Significance codes 0% *** 0.1% ** 1% * 5%
(a) Groupon
Est. Std. Err. Signif.
In
c
e
n
t
. (Intercept) 5.67 0.32 ***
log Price -0.73 0.03 ***
Multi-day? 0.34 0.05 ***
Family edition? -1.40 0.08 ***
S
t
a
r
t
D
a
y
Mon Reference level
Tue 0.11 0.07
Wed 0.22 0.07 **
Thu 0.20 0.06 **
Fri 0.28 0.08 ***
Sat -0.23 0.11 *
Sun -0.27 0.11 *
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
Other Reference level
Beauty 0.23 0.31
Beer/Wine/Spirits 0.11 1.05
Body 0.98 1.05
Dental -0.52 1.05
Education 0.32 0.49
Entertainment 0.11 0.31
Escapes 1.01 0.33 **
General 0.78 1.05
Getaway 0.89 0.36 *
Health -0.05 0.31
Home 0.77 1.05
Photography 0.01 1.05
Quick Bites -1.31 1.05
Restaurant -0.05 0.31
Retail -0.23 0.31
Services 0.13 0.31
Skincare -0.53 1.05
Specialty Food -0.30 0.32
Tour/Experience 0.88 1.05
C
it
y
Atlanta Reference level
Boston -0.51 0.12 ***
Chicago -0.36 0.11 ***
Dallas -0.12 0.13
Detroit -0.83 0.13 ***
Houston 0.17 0.13
Las Vegas -0.20 0.14
Los Angeles 0.46 0.13 ***
Miami -0.41 0.13 **
New Orleans -0.31 0.15 *
New York City 0.45 0.11 ***
Orlando -0.38 0.13 **
Philadelphia -0.25 0.12 *
San Diego -0.13 0.11
San Francisco 0.38 0.13 **
San Jose -0.02 0.16
Seattle 0.52 0.13 ***
Tallahassee -1.31 0.15 ***
Vancouver 0.01 0.14
Washington, D.C. 0.96 0.13 ***
F -statistic 33.2 p-value < 2e-16
R-squared 0.38
Significance codes 0% *** 0.1% ** 1% * 5%
(b) LivingSocial
Table 7: The regression model of deal sizes on their various features.
Est. Std. Err. Signif.
In
c
e
n
t
iv
e
s
(Intercept) 3.35 0.04 ***
log Price -0.07 0.01 ***
log 7am Sales 0.75 0.00 ***
log Threshold 0.16 0.01 ***
Multi-day? 0.33 0.01 ***
Featured? 0.30 0.01 ***
Limited? -0.11 0.01 ***
S
t
a
r
t
D
a
y
Mon Reference level
Tue -0.09 0.02 ***
Wed -0.04 0.02 *
Thu -0.05 0.02 **
Fri -0.09 0.02 ***
Sat -0.07 0.02 ***
Sun 0.05 0.02 *
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
Other Reference level
Arts and Entertainment 0.16 0.04 ***
Automotive -0.11 0.05 *
Beauty & Spas -0.01 0.04
Education 0.10 0.04 *
Financial Services -1.14 0.25 ***
Food & Drink -0.13 0.04 **
Health & Fitness 0.10 0.04 **
Home Services -0.04 0.05
Legal Services -0.42 0.60
Nightlife -0.07 0.05
Pets -0.00 0.08
Professional Services -0.05 0.04
Public Services & Gov. 0.27 0.30
Real Estate -0.11 0.30
Restaurants -0.07 0.04 *
Shopping -0.06 0.04
Travel 0.10 0.05 *
C
it
y
Atlanta Reference level
Boston -0.08 0.03 **
Chicago -0.21 0.03 ***
Dallas -0.12 0.03 ***
Detroit -0.13 0.03 ***
Houston -0.24 0.03 ***
Las Vegas -0.48 0.03 ***
Los Angeles -0.22 0.03 ***
Miami -0.11 0.03 **
New Orleans -0.44 0.04 ***
New York -0.06 0.03 *
Orlando -0.17 0.03 ***
Philadelphia -0.21 0.03 ***
San Diego -0.35 0.03 ***
San Francisco -0.19 0.03 ***
San Jose -0.29 0.04 ***
Seattle -0.24 0.03 ***
Tallahassee -0.49 0.05 ***
Vancouver -0.14 0.04 ***
Washington DC 0.03 0.03
F -statistic 1330 p-value < 2e-16
R-squared 0.81
Significance codes 0% *** 0.1% ** 1% * 5%
(a) The regression model of deal sizes on their fea-
tures with the inclusion of early morning sales as an
independent variable.
Est. Std. Err. Signif.
In
c
e
n
t
iv
e
s
(Intercept) 5.92 0.18 ***
log Price -0.47 0.03 ***
Yelp Rating -0.10 0.03 ***
log Threshold 0.57 0.02 ***
Multi-day? 0.19 0.05 ***
Featured? 0.70 0.05 ***
Limited? -0.04 0.04
S
t
a
r
t
D
a
y
Mon Reference level
Tue 0.06 0.06
Wed 0.08 0.06
Thu 0.07 0.06
Fri 0.04 0.06
Sat -0.16 0.07 *
Sun -0.24 0.07 **
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
Other Reference level
Arts and Entertainment -0.18 0.13
Automotive 0.05 0.16
Beauty & Spas -0.16 0.13
Education -0.19 0.18
Food & Drink -0.01 0.14
Health & Fitness -0.07 0.13
Home Services -1.07 0.25 ***
Nightlife -0.38 0.15 *
Pets -0.39 0.30
Professional Services 0.07 0.17
Restaurants 0.00 0.12
Shopping -0.43 0.14 **
Travel -0.01 0.20
C
it
y
Atlanta Reference level
Boston 0.18 0.11
Chicago 0.38 0.10 ***
Dallas 0.33 0.13 *
Detroit -0.10 0.14
Houston 0.09 0.13
Las Vegas 0.24 0.13 .
Los Angeles 0.33 0.10 **
Miami -0.37 0.14 **
New Orleans -0.74 0.19 ***
New York City 0.08 0.10
Orlando 0.16 0.16
Philadelphia -0.44 0.12 ***
San Diego -0.09 0.12
San Francisco 0.11 0.11
San Jose 0.19 0.14
Seattle 0.39 0.11 ***
Tallahassee -0.65 0.34 .
Vancouver 0.50 0.16 **
Washington DC 0.74 0.12 ***
F -statistic 64.8 p-value < 2e-16
R-squared 0.53
Significance codes 0% *** 0.1% ** 1% * 5%
(b) The regression model of deal sizes on their features
with the inclusion of Yelp rating as an independent
variable.
Table 8: Two alternative regression models for Groupon deal sizes.
Est. Std. Err. Signif.
In
c
e
n
t
iv
e
s
(Intercept) 3.96 0.06 ***
log Price -0.42 0.01 ***
log Likes 0.42 0.01 ***
log Threshold 0.42 0.01 ***
Multi-day? 0.10 0.02 ***
Featured? 0.58 0.02 ***
Limited? -0.01 0.01
S
t
a
r
t
D
a
y
Mon Reference level
Tue 0.07 0.02 **
Wed 0.12 0.02 ***
Thu 0.11 0.02 ***
Fri 0.21 0.02 ***
Sat 0.10 0.03 ***
Sun 0.01 0.03
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
Other Reference level
Arts and Entertainment -0.22 0.05 ***
Automotive 0.32 0.06 ***
Beauty & Spas 0.35 0.05 ***
Education -0.27 0.06 ***
Financial Services -1.36 0.35 ***
Food & Drink 0.17 0.05 **
Health & Fitness 0.02 0.05
Home Services 0.02 0.07
Legal Services -0.73 0.84
Nightlife -0.23 0.07 ***
Pets -0.41 0.11 ***
Professional Services -0.06 0.06
Public Services & Gov. -0.58 0.32 .
Real Estate -0.18 0.42
Restaurants 0.25 0.05 ***
Shopping 0.10 0.05 *
Travel 0.03 0.06
C
it
y
Atlanta Reference level
Boston 0.11 0.04 **
Chicago 0.24 0.03 ***
Dallas 0.04 0.04
Detroit -0.17 0.04 ***
Houston -0.04 0.04
Las Vegas 0.07 0.04 .
Los Angeles 0.14 0.04 ***
Miami -0.17 0.05 ***
New Orleans -0.39 0.05 ***
New York -0.00 0.03
Orlando -0.18 0.04 ***
Philadelphia -0.27 0.04 ***
San Diego -0.04 0.04
San Francisco 0.26 0.04 ***
San Jose 0.08 0.05
Seattle 0.08 0.04 *
Tallahassee -0.59 0.07 ***
Vancouver 0.21 0.05 ***
Washington DC 0.45 0.04 ***
F -statistic 581 p-value < 2e-16
R-squared 0.63
Significance codes 0% *** 0.1% ** 1% * 5%
(a) Groupon
Est. Std. Err. Signif.
In
c
e
n
t
. (Intercept) 3.52 0.24 ***
log Price -0.57 0.02 ***
log Likes 0.82 0.02 ***
Multi-day? 0.22 0.04 ***
Family edition? -0.97 0.06 ***
S
t
a
r
t
D
a
y
Mon Reference level
Tue 0.06 0.05
Wed 0.06 0.05
Thu 0.15 0.05 **
Fri 0.10 0.06
Sat 0.01 0.08
Sun -0.06 0.08
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
Other Reference level
Beauty 0.40 0.22 .
Beer/Wine/Spirits 0.23 0.76
Body 0.10 0.76
Dental 0.01 0.77
Education -0.17 0.35
Entertainment -0.19 0.22
Escapes -0.60 0.24 *
General 0.20 0.76
Getaway -0.68 0.26 **
Health -0.01 0.22
Home 0.31 0.76
Photography 0.20 0.76
Quick Bites -0.48 0.76
Restaurant 0.08 0.22
Retail -0.21 0.23
Services 0.19 0.22
Skincare -0.29 0.76
Specialty Food -0.25 0.23
Tour/Experience 0.52 0.76
C
it
y
Atlanta Reference level
Boston -0.05 0.09
Chicago 0.16 0.08 *
Dallas 0.09 0.10
Detroit -0.52 0.10 ***
Houston 0.17 0.09 .
Las Vegas -0.13 0.10
Los Angeles 0.17 0.09 .
Miami -0.15 0.09
New Orleans 0.10 0.11
New York City 0.44 0.08 ***
Orlando -0.30 0.09 **
Philadelphia 0.02 0.08
San Diego 0.14 0.08 .
San Francisco 0.57 0.10 ***
San Jose 0.16 0.11
Seattle 0.44 0.10 ***
Tallahassee -0.55 0.11 ***
Vancouver 0.45 0.10 ***
Washington, D.C. 0.52 0.10 ***
F -statistic 110 p-value < 2e-16
R-squared 0.67
Significance codes 0% *** 0.1% ** 1% * 5%
(b) LivingSocial
Table 9: The regression model of deal sizes on their features with the inclusion of Facebook activity as an independent variable.
